The author if the law is the people, i. This chief is responsible to the people for his breaches of the law, and in serious cases they can condemn him to death. The real cause of the trouble which prevails among men is the papacy, a "fictitious" power, the development of which is the result of a series of usurpations. Marsilius of Padua does not seem to have lived long after But the scandal provoked by his Defensor pacis, condemned by the court of Avignon in , lasted much longer.
Translated into French, then into Italian 14th century and into English 16th century , it was known by Wycliffe and Luther, and was not without an influence on the Reform movement. News News for News News for News. Everything else is up for contextual debate. Ultimately, even the Prince is put in place by the Legislator—the agency that lays down the laws.
And where does legislative authority come from? The general populace—the People as Legislative Sovereign! In general, every human should have the ability to understand laws as laid down by the human mind. And yet we still must posit one part of society as the legislator or lawmaker. Marsilius reads Aristotle too quickly? The people remain the real legislator even if they elect representatives to serve as a temporary, context- specific lawmakers. Representation should not trump popular legislative sovereignty.
A citizen is anyone who participates in a civil community. This excludes women, children, slaves, and foreigners. Marsilius allows for not just quantitative but also qualitative considerations, which is of course a slippery slope democracy to aristocratic republicanism.
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Aristotle on arithmetic v. The basic idea here is that communally made decisions will more closely approximate the common utility and the common good. This may be a dubious claim, or at least one in need of further clarification… vi. People will be more likely to obey laws they themselves set. Laying the legislative power in the hands of one man or few would be too risky, since the chance for bias and error would be more concentrated and potent. The whole is better at aiming at the whole. The suspension of laws, also, must remain in the hands of the legislator—i.
Law, for Marsilius, is primarily preventative. The strength of law is its universality and impersonality, which combines to hinder the personal animosities that would otherwise taint judicial decisions. The law is an eye made up of many eyes. That is: like many sciences, it has advanced in fits and starts over the course of history. Judicial decisions must then be made in light of legal precedent, not simply on the basis of fresh applications, as if the law were born yesterday. Acting within the law is actually beneficial to the prince, as well, since it reduces the temptation of subjects to sedition.
But what of a hypothetically hyper-virtuous judge?
Probably not! Most men are driven by vice, and so it remains much safer to channel judicial action via the standard of law, which, being no man, can know no vicious inclinations though it can be corrected historically; cf. And guess what Aristotle agrees with that, too! Election, not hereditary rule, is assumed here.
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Given an elected principality, who would constitute the best choice? Two dispositions are required for the best prince: 1. Prudence a. The unique characteristic of the prince, who must make contextual decisions on the basis of practical tactics, not just in some morally pure vacuum. Moral Virtue esp. Justice a. In principle, everyone should strive for this. Prudence is the princely prerogative, especially when it comes to areas not fully covered by human, civil laws.
Thus prudence is needed to navigate the shifting sands of such scenarios. Therefore, a good prince should be endowed with the prudence to navigate extra-legal situations arising in the civic community. Moral goodness, meanwhile, is also needed, since an unjust prince would be of little benefit to the community. Not quite Machiavelli, yet! In addition to justice possibly: correct action in light of the laws , the prince should also have the skill to wield his prudence well.
It is the ability to decide properly when the law is insufficient. This is needed when particular situations grow too particular. In addition to these rather warm and fuzzy inward dispositions, the prince must also wield coercive force. That is how the potential of legal authority is actualized. In practice, this takes the shape of large groups of armed men. To sum up: the best prince would need to demonstrate both a prudence and b moral justice before being elected.
He would not need to wield coercive force beforehand, though he should be granted that power upon election. Finally, love of the people adds to the previous two virtues, although it is not strictly speaking a necessity. And Aristotle confirms all of the above.
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The laws should dispassionately frame the universal questions of civic relations. The prince must preserve the laws in justice, while exercising equity prudently when the law falls short. Which is best: electing a prince and letting his kids take over afterward or electing a new prince upon the death of each previous one?
Sean Hannan MacEwan University February elements might at first seem to incentivize stability and moderation in the ruling families. The force of habit might also accustom the subjected masses to accept the rule of one ongoing family. And are not some families more accomplished than others? Does not hereditary monarchy allow for the training-up of new, virtuous princes? New elections, meanwhile, tend to bring instability. So why court that? Hereditary monarchy is also more predictable for bureaucratic officials. Such succession also quells the ambitions of the masses, for they know they will never ascend the throne.
Hereditary monarchy seems to preserve the natural or cosmic order of the universe, by keeping things unified and well-arranged. There is no guarantee of this within hereditary succession. Therefore, election of a new monarch each time is preferable, since it is allows for the selection of these desirable traits.
Election selects for virtue, whereas succession is a dice-throw. Election does incentivize wise and moderate rule, since the elected monarch wants to ensure the best reputation for himself and his family. If the re- election is ante mortem, then he himself might indeed be in danger of paying for his transgressions while a ruler. The hereditary monarch might actually prove more complacent. It is he who lacks an incentive for political virtue. Succession is also more likely to chance upon tyranny.
There is apparently a concern here about the nouveau riche. Are they not chancing upon funds and then acting belligerently, upsetting the balance of the old feudal lords? Marsilius says no. Wealth is a neutral instrument, usable for good or ill in political settings. As usual, this all depends on the prudence and justice of the user. Novelty, not just custom, may also produce awe and obedience.
The people may need to be awed into submission, but this could happen with rulers both old and new. There is always the chance that old dynasties fade in lustre for an increasingly unstable populace. Sadly, the world seldom offers up exemplary families packed with virtuous members. As with the rule of law, it is better to stick with an electoral system that selects for virtue rather than rolling the dice on the basis of personality. Even if it is possible that the children of virtuous rulers become virtuous rules, the electoral system should still be allowed to make that decision.
Why chance it? What if there are no good leaders to elect? Election still stands a better chance of sorting out the right choice, thereby lessening the odds of schism. The hereditary monarch is just as likely to be led astray by his counsellors as he is to be helped by them. An elected monarchy will both have less need of counsel and more skill in choosing counsellors. The subjected masses will also prefer having an elected monarch, since they will see that the one who rulers over them is indeed prudent and just. They are more apt to be seditious if they see an imprudent, unjust dullard on the throne.
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But what about the seemingly natural universality of hereditary rule? Well, first of all, we are not so sure that this kind of rule is truly universal. Marsilius next rejects the parallel between Cosmic Order and Social Order. A much better parallel would be the internal order of the virtuous prince! The microcosm is within… 1. Does this rejection of the cosmic-political parallel have reverberations soon after Marsilius? Is it different than the ancient standard? Or merely a question of shifted emphasis? Regardless of all these details, it remains clear to Marsilius that a periodically elected monarch is the best for ensuring prudent, just rule in society.
So what happens if the prince breaks the law? The judicial power is in his hands, so who can decide when his decisions constitute transgression of legal precedent? The coercive power is in his hands, so who could punish him? He is the beating animal heart of society. In practice, however, the prince is human.
His desires shift; mutability interrupts his legalistic subjectivity. But who will serve as legislator if not the prince himself? Perhaps: the authority of the people who elected the prince in the first place! Devolution of the princely authority is at least on the table. Serious transgressions by the prince must be punished, lest the civic community itself be torn apart.
Slight transgressions, if rare, should be ignored. Stability of the law and the principality must not be sacrificed for any little fault, as Aristotle warned. However, if slight transgressions are repeated, they must be punished, since they will slowly eat away at the stability of the republic as a whole. Discourse II a. Plotting Roman Bishops 2. Long-Held Misconceptions of Christian Faithful 3.
Bitterness of Jealous Arguers ii. In so doing, they claim to be standing up for Christian truth, but in fact they are warping the Biblical message. And so now Marsilius must show us how his clarification of political power is firmly rooted in the proper interpretation of Scripture, so long corrupted by weaselly clerics. The main claim that must be debunked is that the Pope is owed even secular authority over all of the lands of at least Western Christendom.
Scripture itself will be shown to stand against this. It will be shown that the Pope has absolutely no coercive power over any secular prince—or even, for that matter, over subordinate clerics! This is a tall order! All such doctrines, in his view, are in fact anti-Scriptural. Marsilius now pauses to make sure that he and his readers will be clear on the technical terminology to be deployed. Using that word to talk about the bureaucratic machinery in Rome is merely a recent innovation, says Marsilius. The best definition for the Church, though, is as the entire body of the faithful, taken together.
This is, for Marsilius, its most ancient and truest form. Augustine, but also Hus! But, more specifically, it has to do with transactions that affect other people with regard to their worldly ends. Marsilius takes a firm stand against this last usage of the word. This is part of a general slippage between spiritual and temporal terminology. Over the centuries, the papacy has appropriated to itself too many of the political powers originally belonging to the Roman principate, such as the right to publish decretals. In a sense, anyone who judges can be a judge.
More precisely, however, the word should denote a legal experts or b the prince in his judicial aspect. Does Scripture position the Pope as the Supreme Judge of all others, even princes, in the strongest sense of judgment in this world? Does not the Pope occupy the Seat of Peter and hold his Keys?
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Is he not the Vicar of Christ? Did not Jesus command, even coerce? Does not the Pope wield both the temporal and spiritual Swords? Is the Pope not a universal shepherd over one flock? Do not the clergy have power to pass judgment on all? Are not the clergy exempt from usual forms of accusation? For example: does not the Pope command the prince like soul commands body? Is not spiritual higher than corporeal, even in princely power? Does not the higher end of spiritual roles grant them higher power?
Is not the clerical calling more honourable than any other? Should not the highest honour go to the highest ruler? Did not the Pope receive political power over Europe directly from the Roman Empire and its principate? Would it not be inappropriate for the sacred clergy to bow before secular princes, whose record for sin is clear?
Against all of the above, Marsilius holds that Scripture points directly away from any attempts by spiritual authorities to appropriate political power. Christ, of course, wields authority over even political power.
But it is unclear whether or not He intended to bestow that level of usurping authority on those in the apostolic succession. But even following the example of Christ, it is clear that He did not come down to establish a temporal principate.
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His goal was to point humankind toward eternal ends. Those go together! Can they be trusted? Well… viii. He likewise resisted requests for him to act as a civil judge. Christ not only refused political power Himself; he also urged obedience to political power generally. Clergy members, too, are not exempt from taxes or tribute. All the saints down to Bernard agree: everyone must pay taxes, even priests! He also made sure to avoid exempting any of His followers from the coercive powers of political rulers. All are subject! It is the will of Christ, therefore, that His clerical followers subject themselves as fully as possible to the coercive powers of the secular state.
So what are the clergy good for? They administer the sacraments and clarify states of grace or sin for the community of believers. All of the efficacy of their power is God acting through them, of course. Their role is to manage forgiveness and satisfaction, probably including even indulgences, without usurping the active role of God which merely flows through them. The Lombard agrees.
Ambrose agrees. Scripture agrees: only God can truly judge human interiority. Priests, therefore, are not really like judges. They merely teach about them and participate in the healing process, in the service of the Greater Physician, Christ. Only Christ could enforce His Evangelical Law with coercive force. However, He has refused to do so at this time, instead giving each person the chance to repent before their deaths. It would be ideal for the clergy to live in accordance with the ideal of apostolic property.
Marsilius systematically debunks any claims that such poverty could go hand in hand with large-scale dominion or property-owning by the ministers of Christ. In short: aim to be poor, but if you are not, prepare to be taxed. Discourse III a. So: what was the main source of discord after all? The avaricious desire of the clergy for secular power, which disrupts the natural balance of peace in civil society. If these false claims to political power could be uprooted, peace and tranquillity would be in reach of the civic community. Eternal Salvation can be attained by following the Scriptures and what they entail!
Only a divine council of the faithful can adjudicate concerning disputes over the divine law. Contra Papal prerogative… iii. There can be no temporal punishments for spiritual transgressions. Only the Evangelical Law is required for salvation. No mortal can give special dispensation concerning divine law. Properly speaking, the universal body of the citizens is the human legislator. The prince could only be the legislator in a derivative sense. To Skinner, this is the huge claim!
Clerical decrees have no temporal-coercive sway. Only the Legislator i. The Prince cannot so decide for himself. Elected principate depends entirely on the body of electors. Elected principate in turn depends on will of the legislator. Skinner says mostly b , although many have argued a.
There should only be one principate in any city or realm. The elected prince shall choose the officers of the city. Both executive and judicial, seemingly…? Princely power is not absolute unless so stated by the popular Legislator. No cleric has principate over any other, even if a heretic. By authority of the Legislator, only the Prince has coercive jurisdiction over every member of society, cleric or otherwise.
Clerics cannot excommunicate without legislative approval. Contra even Hobbes!